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THERE'S NOTHING SPECIAL ABOUT SEX:
THE SUPREME COURT MAINSTREAMS SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
Rebecca Hanner White*
In this Essay, Professor White argues that the Supreme Court finally has merged
analysis of sexual harassment law with other claims of intentional discrimination.
Professor White contends that the Court's decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB
v. Vinson created confusion over the proper analysis of sexual harassment claims
by seemingly embracing quid pro quo and hostile work environment theories as
distinct forms of discrimination and by suggesting that at least some sexual
harassment claims may warrant a revised approach to employer liability. In the
wake of Meritor, sexual harassment claims increasingly were evaluated differently
from other claims of disparate treatment, both in determining whether harassment
was because of sex and in determining employer liability for the harassment. Last
term's decisions are aimed at ending that distinctive treatment, placing sexual
harassment claims firmly in the mainstream of disparate treatment theory. Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. teaches that unlawful motive in sexual
harassment claims is to be evaluated on the same terms as other disparate treatment
claims. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
while recognizing and clarifying vicarious employer liability principles for sexual
harassment, also should be understood to govern employer liability for all disparate
treatment occurring at the hands of supervisors, whether or not sexual harassment
is involved. Professor White accordingly contends that the Court's decisions from
last Term have clarified both sexual harassment in particular and disparate
treatment law generally.
INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment has bedeviled courts from the outset. Whether a result of
national prudery or squeamishness about sex' or of a "boys will be boys" mentality,'
" Professor of Law, University of Georgia. I thank my research assistant, Donna Keeton,
for her work.
' See Michael D. Vhay, Comment, The Harms of Asking: Towards A Comprehensive
Treatment of Sexual Harassment, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 328, 350 (1988) ("Because sexual
harassment involves a subject that often embarrasses and perplexes American
society-sexual behavior-its discriminatory aspects have been accorded special
treatment."). America's "puritanical" approach to sexual behavior recently was the object of
international comment as details concerning Bill Clinton's relationship with Monica
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federal judges confronting sexual harassment cases have treated these claims as
something special or different from run of the mill discrimination claims. From
initially refusing to recognize sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination,3 to
constructing elaborate employer liability theories,4 courts have struggled with how
sexual harassment fits into the Title VII landscape.
The Supreme Court has contributed to this notion that sexual harassment is a
distinct form of discrimination. Its decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson,5 while recognizing sexual harassment as actionable under Title VII,
eschewed the traditional Title VII categories of disparate treatment and disparate
impact in discussing Vinson's allegations of sex discrimination. The Court instead
accepted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") division of
sexual harassment claims into two categories: quid pro quo and hostile work
environment.6
A "quid pro quo" claim would be present, the Court acknowledged, when the
victim alleged that she suffered a tangible job detriment as a result of rejecting her
employer's sexual advances.7 Although Vinson did not assert a quid pro quo claim,
the Court in Meritor held that even when no tangible harm has occurred, a sexual
harassment claim still may exist if a "hostile work environment" has been created.8
In Meritor, the Court set forth a standard for determining when a hostile work
environment will be present: Unwelcome sexual conduct that is sufficiently severe
Lewinsky unfolded. See Andrew Marshall, Let's Not Talk About Sex, INDEPENDENT
(London), Sept. 16, 1998, at 1; Tod Robberson, Clinton Problems Barely Turns Heads in
Latin America, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 14, 1998, at 37A.
2 See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1041 (1987).
' See Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D. N.J. 1976), revd,
568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz.
1975), vacated and remanded, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
' See Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997), vacated and
remanded, 118 S. Ct. 2364 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530 (1 th Cir.
1997) (en banc), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1011 (1995); Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 512 U.S. 1213 (1994). These cases are all cited in Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2282, as
exemplifying the "different approaches" to employer liability taken by the courts of appeals.
5 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
6 See id at 65. See EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11
(1998).
7 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. The Guidelines define quid pro quo harassment as
conditioning a job benefit or detriment on the granting or withholding of sexual favors. See
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11.
' Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66.
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or pervasive so as to constitute a hostile or abusive working environment will support
a Title VII claim. 9
The Court in Meritor went on to address, albeit obliquely, the question of
employer liability for sexual harassment. Although vicarious employer liability had
been applied routinely in other employment discrimination contexts, 0 the Court
suggested that vicarious liability may not be appropriate in some sexual harassment
cases." It left unresolved, however, under what circumstances employer liability for
sexual harassment would exist.
In the wake of Meritor, courts were left to decide a number of unresolved issues,
such as whether conduct of a sexual nature was unwelcome, 2 whether such conduct
was severe or pervasive enough to support a claim, 3 whether severity or
pervasiveness should be judged by a subjective or an objective standard, 4 whether
a "reasonable person" or a "reasonable woman" standard should govern assessment
of severity or pervasiveness,"5 whether a victim must establish psychological harm' 6
and, importantly, under which circumstances an employer may be held liable for
sexual harassment engaged in by supervisors, 17 coworkers," or even customers. 19
9 See id at 67-68.
'o See Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599 (7th Cir. 1985); Miller v. Bank of Am., 600
F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
Vicarious liability holds a principal liable for the acts of its agents. As applied in the
employment context, it would hold an employer liable for the acts of its employees. See W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 69-70, at 499-507
(5th ed. 1984).
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
We ... decline the parties' invitation to issue a definitive rule on employer
liability, but we do agree with the EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look to
agency principles for guidance in this area. While such common-law principles
may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII, Congress' decision
to define 'employer' to include any 'agent' of an employer.., surely evinces an
intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under
Title VII are to be held responsible.
Id.
2 See, e.g., Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993).
'* See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark.), appeal dismissed, 138 F.3d
758 (8th Cir. 1998).
'4 See, e.g., Saxton v. AT & T, 10 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1993).
's See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Radtke v. Everett, 501
N.W.2d 155 (Mich. 1993) (en banc).
16 See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 510 U.S. 17
(1993).
'7 See sources cited supra note 10.
's See, e.g., Fleming v. Boeing Co., 120 F.3d 242 (1 1th Cir. 1997).
'9 See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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Courts were not alone in exploring sexual harassment as a unique form of
employment discrimination. Academic commentary addressing each of the above
issues proliferated," as did elaborate attempts to explain why sexual harassment is
a legal wrong by reference to "subordinating" gender norms,2' sex stereotyping,22 or
feminist legal theory.2
The number of cases proliferated as well. Since Anita Hill's testimony during
Clarence Thomas's confirmation hearings and continuing until today, the number of
sexual harassment claims filed with the EEOC has increased dramatically.
24
Moreover, just as the theories in the law reviews grew more complex, so too did the
factual scenarios presented to the courts. Cases straddling the divide between quid
pro quo and hostile work environments arose: Employees who were asked to trade
sex for jobs said "yes" and suffered no tangible harm, 25 and said "no" and suffered
no tangible harm.26 Men working in predominately female work environments
alleged their workplace was sexually charged and hostile,27 as did both men and
women working in single sex settings.2 1 Same-sex harassment cases involving both
20 The academic commentary on many of these issues is far too voluminous to cite in full.
A search of LEXIS's law review data base found 343 articles since 1986 dealing with issues
involving sexual harassment. Illustrative of articles discussing the issues noted above are:
Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813 (1991); Gillian K. Hadfield, Rational
Women: A Test for Sex-Based Harassment, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1151 (1995); David Benjamin
Oppenheimer, Exacerbating and Exasperating: Title VII Liability of Employers for Sexual
Harassment Committed By Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 66 (1995); Michael J.
Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under Agency Principles. A Second Look
at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 44 VAND. L. REv. 1229 (1991); Mary F. Radford,
By Invitation Only: The Proof of Welcomeness in Sexual Harassment Cases, 72 N.C. L. REV.
499 (1994).
21 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987).
22 See Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV.
691 (1997).
23 See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183 (1989).
24 See Lisa Barre-Quick & Shannon Matthew Kasky, The Road Less Traveled: Obstacles
in the Path of the Effective Use of The Civil Rights Provision of the Violence Against Women
Act in the Employment Context, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 415, 422 n.26 (1998) (quoting
EEOC statistics which show that sexual harassment charges filed by women increased from
approximately 6,300 in 1991 to 14,140 in 1997).
25 See Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 778 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S.
1213 (1994).
26 See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam), afl'd,
118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).27 See Jane Gross, Now Look Who's Taunting, Who's Suing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1995,
§ 4, at 1 (describing the case of the "Jenny Craig Eight," a group of men who claimed they
were harassed by women in their predominately female workplace).
28 See, e.g., Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368 (C.D. Cal. 1995)
(holding that female employees complaining of vulgar behavior by their female supervisor
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quid pro quo and hostile work environment claims began growing in number.29
Courts confronting these claims developed conflicting approaches to resolving them,
adding to the confusion over when sexual harassment would be actionable. Sexual
harassment law, in short, was fast becoming a topic that could be covered adequately
only in a mini-course of its own, rather than as part of a standard course in
employment discrimination.
The difficulties surrounding sexual harassment manifested themselves in the
Supreme Court's docket last Term. With an unprecedented focus on a particular
aspect of employment discrimination, the Court decided three Title VII claims
involving sexual harassment. 0 While the Court's decisions by no means resolved all
of the confusion swirling around sexual harassment, they did provide some much
needed clarity.
Taken as a whole, the result of last Term's focus on sexual harassment is this:
There's nothing special about sex; sexual harassment claims simply are disparate
treatment claims. Accordingly, traditional disparate treatment analysis should guide
their resolution.
This message from the Court should have been an unnecessary statement of the
obvious,3 but it was not. In the years since sexual harassment claims first were
recognized as actionable sex discrimination, the gap between how courts approach
disparate treatment claims and how they approach sexual harassment claims had been
growing wider. 2 Last Term's opinions bridged that gap, asking courts to consider
questions of unlawful motive in sexual harassment cases just as they would consider
motivation questions in other Title VII claims.33 Moreover, the Court confirmed that
vicarious employer liability for sexual harassment, as for other forms of employment
discrimination, is appropriate.3 4
had no discrimination claim); Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(holding that a male claiming harassment had no valid claim because he worked in a
predominately male environment).
29 See Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims After Oncale: Defining
the Boundaries ofActionable Conduct, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 677, 689 n.61 (1998).
" See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998); Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct.
2275 (1998). The Court also decided a sexual harassment case under Title IX, see Gebser
v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998), bringing the number of sexual
harassment cases decided last Term to four.
" It is a premise that has been understood by some courts and some commentators for
years. See, e.g., McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Vhay, supra note 1, at
337, 355.
32 See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998)
(criticizing courts for distinguishing allegations of sexual harassment from other allegations
of sex discrimination).
13 See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. 998.
" See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. 2275.
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At the same time, because sexual harassment claims are disparate treatment
claims, the liability principles established in the Court's sexual harassment cases of
last Term should be understood to apply to other Title VII disparate treatment claims
as well.35 Rather than viewing sexual harassment as a special and distinct category
of claim deserving of special and distinct treatment on motive or liability questions,
the Court sought to mainstream sexual harassment law, merging analysis of such
claims with other claims of intentional discrimination.
While sexual harassment claims are simply disparate treatment claims, that does
not mean such claims are simple. The Court left difficult evidentiary problems
unresolved. Nonetheless, the Court's straightforward approach to sexual harassment
cases was refreshing. A unified legal analysis to claims of disparate treatment,
including those involving sexual harassment, is a step long overdue in the
development of Title VII law.
This Essay explores the questions presented to the Court and explains how the
Court's resolution of those issues clarifies and simplifies not only the law of sexual
harassment but disparate treatment law in general. Rather than seeking to distinguish
"quid pro quo" from "hostile work environment" claims, courts should ask instead
whether an individual has experienced a tangible job action because of her sex (or
race, color, religion, national origin, or complaint of retaliation).36 If so, she has a
Title VII claim. If not, she yet may have a discrimination claim if improperly
motivated conduct, while resulting in no tangible job action, nonetheless is
attributable to her employer, directly or vicariously.37
I. ONCALE V. SUNDOWNER OFFSHORE SERVICES, INC.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.3" presented the Court with the
question of whether same-sex harassment is actionable under Title VII. Joseph
" See Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding that vicarious liability principles developed in Ellerth and Faragher were not
limited to sexual harassment claims).
36 See Eugene Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 307 (1998) (urging abandonment of quid pro quo harassment as
a separate category of disparate treatment claims).
" In Ellerth and Faragher, the Court considered the question of vicarious employer
liability for supervisory harassment. Occasionally, however, an employer will be directly
liable for intentional discrimination, usually in systemic cases in which a discriminatory
policy or practice exists. In such cases, the employer will be liable, whether or not the
discrimination results in a tangible, material harm. See Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis
Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121 (1998).
When vicarious, not direct, liability is at issue, the employer may avoid liability, when
no tangible employment action exists, by establishing the affirmative defense outlined by the
Court this Term. See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
38 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
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Oncale, a roustabout on a males-only oil rig, alleged he had been the victim of
unwelcome, severe, and pervasive conduct of a sexual nature from his male
supervisor and male coworkers.39 The Fifth Circuit dismissed Oncale's claim on
summary judgment, reasoning that same-sex harassment was not actionable under
Title VII.4 In the Fifth Circuit's view, a man's harassment of a man because of sex,
or a woman's harassment of a woman because of sex, was not unlawful
discrimination within the meaning of Title VII.41
The Fifth Circuit's categorical rejection of same-sex harassment claims illustrates
how far sexual harassment cases had drifted from disparate treatment theory.42
Disparate treatment, the Supreme Court explained over twenty years ago,
is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer
simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is
critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact
of differences in treatment. 3
Accordingly, if a man is treated less favorably than others because he is a man, or a
woman is treated less favorably than others because she is a woman, a disparate
treatment claim will exist. The sex of the person doing the discriminating is not an
element of the claim.
Had the question of same-sex discrimination been presented to the Fifth Circuit
in a scenario free from sexual harassment, that court surely would not have believed
the discrimination to be outside the statute's reach. For example, had a woman
refused to hire another woman because she believed women with young children
should not work outside the home, it is difficult to imagine the Fifth Circuit rejecting
that claim. 44 But when claims of same-sex discrimination involved claims of sexual
harassment, the Fifth Circuit refused to find actionable discrimination. Presented
with allegations from men who claimed they had been groped, fondled, or sexually
39 See id. at 1000-01.
40 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118
S. Ct. 998 (1998).
41 See id. at 120. The Fifth Circuit was following established circuit precedent in denying
Oncale's claim. See Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446,451-52 (5th Cir. 1994).
42 See Schultz, supra note 32, at 1714-15. ("Despite the origin of hostile work
environment harassment in the law of disparate treatment, courts have developed analyses
that distinguish the two causes of action and endow each with a life of its own; to many
courts, the two claims have become 'factually and legally distinct."').
41 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
44 For example, in Martinez v. El Paso County, 710 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1983), the Fifth
Circuit affirmed a trial court's finding of sex discrimination brought by a male clerical
worker who claimed his male boss had fired him because of his sex.
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assaulted by other men and who sought recovery for a work environment they
claimed was hostile or abusive, the Fifth Circuit saw not sex discrimination, but
sexual horseplay.4" Offensive and disgusting horseplay, perhaps, but still horseplay.
From those cases evolved the Fifth Circuit's pronouncement in Oncale that male on
male or female on female harassment could not support a Title VII claim.46
Other circuits, too, struggled with how to address claims of same-sex harassment.
The Fourth Circuit rejected claims of same-sex harassment in all but one situation.
When the person doing the harassing was homosexual, his victim was entitled to a
sexual harassment claim under either quid pro quo or hostile work environment
theories.47 In such cases, the Fourth Circuit reasoned, the claims were akin to those
presented in a heterosexual context. But for the victim's gender, he would not have
been propositioned sexually by his homosexual supervisor.48 Thus, the Fourth
Circuit, unlike the Fifth, envisioned male on male or female on female harassment
claims that would be actionable, but only when those claims were the result of sexual
desire. The sexual preference of the harasser supplied, for the Fourth Circuit, the
necessary link between the victim's gender and the harassment.
Absent a homosexual harasser, however, the Fourth Circuit, like the Fifth,
regarded same-sex harassment as mere horseplay not actionable under Title VII. The
Fourth Circuit refused to recognize claims by employees who claimed they had been
the target of same-sex harassment that was sexual in nature when the harasser was
a heterosexual.49
The Seventh Circuit took a decidedly different approach to such claims. For that
court, when the harassment was sexual in nature, an actionable sexual harassment
claim existed." The court equated conduct of a sexual nature to gender-based
conduct, reasoning that when harassment is accomplished through sexual conduct,
the motivation behind the harassment is the victim's sex."
The Supreme Court rejected each of these approaches in Oncale. In a unanimous
decision by Justice Scalia, the Court began by stating what should have been
obvious: "If our precedents leave any doubt on the question," said the Court, "we
hold today that nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination
41 See, e.g., Garcia, 28 F.3d 446. See also Storrow, supra note 29, at 693 n.72 (collecting
cases from the Fifth Circuit following Garcia).
46 See Oncale, 83 F.3d at 120.
47 See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996).
48 See id. at 143-44; Fredette v. BVP Management Assoc., 112 F.3d 1503 (11 th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1184 (1998) (explaining this line of reasoning); Tietgen v.
Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D. Va. 1996).
49 See McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195-96 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 819 (1996).
50 See Doe v. City of Belleville, Iii., 119 F.3d 563, 574 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and
remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998).
"' See id at 580.
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'because of ... sex' merely because the plaintiff and the defendant (or the person
charged with acting on behalf of the defendant) are of the same sex." 2 The Court
then went on to reject the "bewildering variety" of approaches taken by the lower
courts.53 Because discrimination because of sex, not discrimination motivated by
sexual desire, is what the statute prohibits, the notion that the harasser must be
homosexual before a same-sex harassment claim may exist was wrong. 54 A fact
finder may find discrimination, the Court reasoned, "if a female victim is harassed
in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that
the harasser is motivated by general' hostility to the presence of women in the
workplace."5 The Court also rejected the contention that when harassment is sexual
it is necessarily gender-based. As Justice Scalia observed: "We have never held that
workplace harassment, even harassment between men and women, is automatically
discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or
connotations."5' 6 The question is not whether the harassment is sexual but whether
it is being directed against this particular individual because of his sex.
A. Proving Unlawful Motive for Same-sex Harassment
The Oncale holding thus makes liability for sexual harassment dependent, as it
should be, on a finding of unlawful motive. The decision also explained, however,
why that motive inquiry, usually central in disparate treatment cases,57 often is not at
issue in sexual harassment cases. When a male or female sexually propositions a
member of the opposite sex, "it is reasonable to assume those proposals would not
have been made to someone of the same sex."' So, too, when a homosexual harasser
52 Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001-02. As the Court noted, "'[b]ecause of the many facets of
human motivation, it would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings of
one definable group will not discriminate against other members of that [sic] group."' Id at
1001 (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977)).
" Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
54 See id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
"' A search for unlawful motive is at the heart of most disparate treatment claims.
Through a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has established a method for establishing
unlawful motive in circumstantial evidence cases. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502 (1993); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
58 Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002. The McDonnell Douglas/Burdine/Hicks proof scheme is
rarely, if ever, employed in sexual harassment cases. As the Court in Oncale recognized,
when harassment of a sexual nature occurs between men and women, a reasonable
assumption is that the harassment occurs because of sex. The "reasonableness" of this
assumption reflects a presumption of heterosexuality. For criticism of the heterosexuality
presumption, see Storrow, supra note 29, at 736-42.
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sexually propositions someone of the same sex, "the same chain of inference would
be available to a plaintiff... ."" Sexual desire or overtly sexual conduct suggests
that sex is the cause of the harassment. It is, however, only an inference of
discriminatory motive that the sexual nature of the harassment provides;' the sexual
nature of the harassment is not an independent statutory wrong.
In other words, sexual harassment is not something separate and apart from sex-
based harassment.6 Rather, it is sex-based harassment. The fact that the harassment
is sexual in nature may (and often will) be powerful evidence that the victim is
suffering the harassment because of her sex. The defendant, however, may avoid
liability if the fact finder is convinced that the victim was not a target of the
harassment because of her sex, whether or not the harassment was sexual in nature.
Left unresolved by the Court in Oncale, however, was precisely how a victim of
harassment, particularly in a single sex environment, could show the harassment was
sex-based. As mentioned above, evidence of sexual desire and of sexual conduct
may support an inference that the harassment was sex-based, but neither is an
exclusive nor an outcome determinative method of proof. The question, as in other
9 Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
60 See id.
61 But see Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 8, Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (No. 96-568) (distinguishing sex-
based harassment from sexual harassment). Amici were not alone, however, in making a
distinction between the two situations. The EEOC long has treated sexual harassment as a
distinct subset of sex-based harassment. See EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH) § 615.6;
EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1998). Sex-based
harassment, the EEOC reasons, is harassment that is directed toward a woman because of her
sex but involves conduct that is not sexual in nature. See id.
Amici, however, would distinguish sex-based harassment from sexual harassment
because they view sexual harassment as an independent wrong. As more fully explained in
a law review article by Professor Katherine Franke, one of the Amici briefs coauthors,
harassment is a wrong "when it reflects or perpetuates gender stereotypes in the
workplace.... [t]hat is [when] it perpetuates, enforces and polices a set of gender norms that
seek to feminize women and masculinize men." Franke, supra note 22, at 696. As she states:
It grossly oversimplifies a complex performative and regulatory practice
like sexual harassment to demand that the law provide one formal and
symmetrical account of the workplace harm, such as the jurisprudence of "but
for" causation .... Conceiving of sexual harassment as a part of and as an
instrument in the policing, enforcement, and perpetuation of hetero-patriarchal
gender norms requires that we contextualize the conduct in order to understand
it as sex discrimination.
Id. at 771. Professor Franke criticizes, moreover, the focus on motive in sexual harassment
claims. See id. Contrary to her suggestion, in Oncale the Court regarded sexual harassment
as sex-based disparate treatment, looking to the harasser's motive as critical to establishing
a claim. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
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sex-based disparate treatment claims, is whether the plaintiff experienced the conduct
because of her sex.
Potentially confusing is the Court's quotation of Justice Ginsburg's concurrence
in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.62 The Court in Oncale quoted Ginsburg's assertion
that "[t]he critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether members of one sex are
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members
of the other sex are not exposed."63 Does this mean that evidence of disparate
treatment must be presented before a successful sexual harassment claim may be
stated? The answer, obviously, is no. The Court cannot mean this statement literally,
or it would have dismissed Oncale's claim. Oncale, after all, worked in a single sex
environment and thus could not make a showing of differential treatment.
Rather, evidence of different treatment of the sexes simply is evidence that the
treatment was motivated by sex, not an element of a disparate treatment claim. Just
as the sexual nature of the harassment may supply proof of unlawful motive, so too
can differences in treatment between men and women. But such differences are not
an exclusive method of proof. The Court's decision went on to clarify this point by
describing such comparative evidence as only one way in which unlawful motive
may be proven. As the Court emphasized: "Whatever evidentiary route the plaintiff
chooses to follow," discrimination because of sex must be proved.'
Commentators have proposed other evidentiary routes. For example, Vicki
Shultz suggests that when a woman suffers harassment, whether or not it has sexual
overtones, in a male-dominated workplace, it is reasonable to infer that she is the
victim of that harassment because of her sex.65 Professor Shultz reasons that when
women enter a traditionally segregated workplace, men often will try to drive women
out by harassing them and, consequently, courts should be willing to infer that when
such harassment occurs, it is because the victim is a woman." This approach makes
sense intuitively, and is consistent with Oncale, provided courts keep in mind that it
is only an inference of sex-based discrimination that is created, not a conclusive
method of proof.67 After all, a woman in a male-dominated workplace may be
62 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
63 Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,25 (1993)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
' Id. at 1002. Actionable discrimination need only be a difference in treatment the
plaintiff is experiencing because he is a man. The absence of a comparator of the opposite
sex does not mean that no discrimination has occurred.
65 See Schultz, supra note 32, at 1801. Professor Shultz criticizes courts for paying too
much attention to whether the harassment is sexual in nature and not enough attention to
whether nonsexual harassment is in fact sex-based. See id.
6 See id.
67 Schultz recognizes this point, characterizing her suggestion that when harassing,
nonsexual conduct is directed toward women in "traditionally segregated job categories," a
rebuttable presumption that the conduct was because of sex should exist. Id.
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harassed because she is a woman, or she may be harassed because she is a jerk. The
former situation would support a Title VII claim; the latter would not.
B. Causation: Burdens of Production and Proof
Whatever evidentiary route is followed, the Court's placement of sexual
harassment claims into the mainstream of disparate treatment theory clarifies the legal
analysis to be employed. Because these are disparate treatment claims, it is the
plaintiff who bears the burden of proving the harassment was because of sex. The
burden of persuasion never shifts.68
As a result of the 1991 Civil Rights Act's amendments to Title VII, however, it
would seem that the plaintiff carries her burden by proving that her sex was a
motivating factor in the harassment, not that it was the "but-for" cause of the
harassment. Section 703(m) of the Civil Rights Act provides that an unlawful
employment practice is established when the plaintiff proves her sex (or race,
religion, color, or national origin) "was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice."'69 Thus, to continue
with the example above, if a woman were targeted for harassment not simply because
she was a woman but because she was a woman who was a jerk, she could carry her
burden of proving that her sex was a motivating factor for the harassment.
The courts have disagreed about the meaning of section 703(m) in disparate
treatment cases. Some courts consider section 703(m) applicable only to cases
involving "direct evidence" of unlawful motive, requiring plaintiffs to establish "but-
for" causation in circumstantial evidence cases.7" This reasoning is problematic,
requiring fact finders not only to determine whether an unlawful motive exists but to
68 See sources cited supra note 57.
69 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994). The statute was amended in response to the Court's
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In Price Waterhouse, the
Court found that when a plaintiff established that her sex was a substantial motivating factor
for the challenged employment decision, liability was established unless the defendant could
prove it would have made the same decision anyway. Under the amended statute, the
defendant's satisfactory proof of this affirmative defense limitt only remedies, not liability.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994). See also Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563,593
(7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998); Storrow, supra note 29, at
686 n.44 (assuming, without discussion, that section 703(m) will govern analysis of sexual
harassment claims).
70 See Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1141 (4th Cir. 1995). Essentially, courts have
found that only cases involving direct evidence properly can be regarded as "mixed motive"
cases and further have found that only "mixed motive" cases qualify for the "motivating
factor" approach of section 703(m). See id. at 1141-42. In circumstantial evidence, otherwise
known as "pretext" cases, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the existence of "but-
for" causation. See id. at 1141.
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distinguish between the forms of evidence that led them to that conclusion.7 It is not
unusual for a mixture of direct and circumstantial evidence to be presented in a single
case. If the direct evidence is credited, these courts would allow plaintiffs to
establish liability by showing that the unlawful motive was a motivating factor for the
employment action, even though other factors also may have motivated the decision.
If it is the circumstantial evidence that is credited, however, these courts would
require the plaintiff to establish "but-for" causation.7" This approach makes little
sense, particularly when one recognizesthat it likely will be a combination of all of
the evidence, direct and circumstantial, that causes a fact finder to accept or to reject
the allegations of unlawful motive.
The better reasoned view applies section 703(m) to all disparate treatment cases,
whether or not direct evidence is involved. Certainly, the statute itself makes no
distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Instead, on its face, the
statute makes unlawful any employment practice for which the protected trait is a
motivating factor.73
Moreover, courts have had difficulty distinguishing direct from circumstantial
evidence in disparate treatment cases.74 Sexual harassment cases, when considered
as disparate treatment claims, exemplify this difficulty. Is "I want to have sex with
you," when said by-,a male supervisor to his female subordinate, direct or
circumstantial evidence that the woman has been the target of this conduct because
of her sex? The Court's'Oncale decision suggests it is merely circumstantial
evidence of unlawful motive, but evidence that would be sufficient to establish
unlawful motive.7"
71 See Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment
Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REv. 563, 600-21 (1996). Professor Zimmer outlines
the problems of distinguishing between direct and circumstantial evidence cases in applying
section 703(m) and further points out that, in actuality, all evidence of unlawful motive in
fact is circumstantial. See id. at 614-16.
72 See id at 603-04. See also Miller v. Cigna Corp., 47 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1995)
(exemplifying these difficulties).
71 See Curley v. St. John's Univ., 19 F. Supp. 2d 181, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Zimmer,
supra note 71, at 601-02. As the court noted in Curley: "Overall, the 1991 Act has erased the
key distinctions between parties' burdens in 'pretext' and 'mixed motive' analyses," an
elimination that "has unified discrimination law analysis." Id. at 188-89.
7' Direct evidence, as defined by the EEOC, is evidence that both facially demonstrates
bias and is linked to the complained of adverse action. See EEOC: Revised Enforcement
Guide on Recent Developments in Disparate Treatment Theory, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No.
859, 405:6915, at 6917 (July 7, 1992). For recent cases struggling with whether evidence is
sufficiently direct, see Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 521 n.13 (3d Cir.
1997), and Fortier v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 161 F.3d 1106 (7th Cir.
1998).
71 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998). But see
Scalia, supra note 36, at 313 (arguing that a quid pro quo proposition is "powerful direct
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Recognizing that section 703(m) applies to whatever form the evidence takes
relieves courts and juries from the necessity of drawing such artificial and
unnecessary distinctions. Instead, the question in sexual harassment cases, as in
other disparate treatment cases, is whether the plaintiff has proven her sex was a
motivating factor for the complained of conduct.
Applying section 703(m) to cases of same-sex harassment also helps resolve the
troubling analytical problem of distinguishing harassment based on sex from
harassment based on sexual orientation.76 A man who has been targeted for
harassment because he is homosexual and because he is a man who fails to conform
to gender stereotypes of masculine behavior would have a Title VII claim.77
Untangling the two motivations is unnecessary for establishing liability. Recognizing
that plaintiffs need only prove that their sex was a motivating factor for harassment
answers the criticisms of those concerned about the difficulties of proving "but-for"
causation in same-sex harassment cases, 78 while obtaining the simplicity of a unified.
approach to disparate treatment claims.
C. Remedial Implications
Burdens of production and proof aside, there is another important consequence
of the Court's recognition in Oncale that sexual harassment claims are disparate
treatment claims. Only successful claims of disparate treatment entitle the plaintiff
to recovery of compensatory and punitive damages. 79 Disparate impact claims may
not support such relief8"
In the years since Meritor, courts have suggested from time to time that hostile
work environment claims are akin to claims of disparate impact, asserting it is the
effect on the victim, not the defendant's motivation, that gives rise to a claim.
8
'
However, this impact approach to sexual harassment claims is incorrect. Sexual
evidence of discriminatory motive").
76 The lower courts consistently have found discrimination based on sexual orientation
outside the protections of Title VII. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d
327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979).
7 While sexual harassment is not a legal wrong because it is a product of sex-
stereotyping, when it is proven to have been a product of such stereotyping, then the
necessary link between the victim's sex and the harassment has been established. Compare
Franke, supra note 22 (stating that sexual harassment is unlawful because it enforces
stereotypical gender norms), with Schultz, supra note 32, at 1801 (stating that harassment
that "denigrat[es] the harassee's manhood" should be viewed as sex-based, whether or not
it is sexual in nature).
78 See Franke, supra note 22, at 746, 756, 770 (criticizing "but-for" causation inquiry as
underprotective of sexual harassment victims).
79 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994).
80 See id.
8" See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991).
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harassment is intentional discrimination. 2 Whether the perpetrator intends his victim
to suffer is not the point; as with other disparate treatment claims, the question is
whether or not the conduct was motivated by the victim's sex.83 If so, then an intent
to discriminate exists.
Moreover, it was the lack of a remedy for sexual harassment claims based on a
hostile work environment that prompted, in large measure, Congress' willingness to
amend Title VII to allow for recovery of compensatory and punitive damages. Such
damages were necessary, Congress believed, because the victims of hostile work
environment harassment often had no remedy for statutory violations, because Title
VII only permitted recovery of equitable relief.84 Because a hostile work
environment plaintiff frequently suffered no out-of-pocket loss, she had no statutory
remedy available for an acknowledged statutory violation.
In allowing for recovery of compensatory and punitive damages under Title VII,
however, Congress expressly limited such recovery only to victims of "intentional
discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate
impact)." 5 Equating hostile work environment claims to those alleging disparate
impact is inconsistent with recovering damages for such claims. The Court's
recognition in Oncale that hostile work environment claims are disparate treatment
claims precludes defendants from avoiding damages for hostile work environments
by positioning such claims as impact, not treatment, based.
That sexual harassment claims are treatment, not impact claims, was further
underscored by the Court's resolution, on the last day of the Term, of the question
of employer liability for sexual harassment.86 Those decisions, together with the
Oncale decision, place sexual harassment cases squarely into the disparate treatment
model of discrimination.
82 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2266 (1998).
83 Animus, in the sense of hatred or ill-will, is not an element of a disparate treatment
claim. The question, instead, is whether an employer's action was taken because of the
victim's sex, race, or other protected characteristic. See International Union v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991); City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978); Phillips v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544
(1971).
84 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2(1), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 ("The
Congress finds that.., additional remedies.., are needed to deter unlawful harassment and
intentional discrimination in the workplace."). See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 66-69
(1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 604-07; H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 24-29
(1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 717-23.
85 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994).
86 See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
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1I. BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC. V. ELLERTH AND FARAGHER V. CITY OF
BOCA RA TON
Perhaps the most troublesome issue to arise out of sexual harassment cases in the
wake of Meritor was the question of employer liability for sexual harassment. Lower
courts had assumed, with little discussion, that employers would be vicariously liable
for quid pro quo sexual harassment. 7 Vicarious liability imposes liability on a
principal (employer) for the torts of his agents (supervisory employees)."8 Courts
routinely have applied vicarious employer liability to other claims of disparate
treatment and similarly have viewed quid pro quo claims as meriting application of
vicarious liability principles. 9 When a hostile work environment claim was at issue,
however, lower courts generally refused to hold employers vicariously liable.
Instead, an employer would be liable for a hostile work environment only if it knew
or should have known of the harassment and failed to take steps to correct it.90
Employer liability for hostile work environments was thus direct, not vicarious,
because it was the employer's own wrongdoing, not that of its agents, for which
liability was being imposed.
These different approaches by the lower courts to employer liability for quid pro
quo and hostile work environment claims made it important to distinguish between
the two forms of sexual harassment. That distinction, however, was not always easy
to achieve. The facts in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth9" exemplified the
problem.
Kimberly Ellerth alleged that during her employment with Burlington Industries,
a manager had threatened, on several occasions, to retaliate against her (in some
unspecified way) if she refused his sexual advances.92 Ellerth refused the advances,
yet no retaliation occurred.93 The district court found, and the Supreme Court
assumed for purposes of its decision, that the conduct was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment.94 Because Ellerth had never
" See Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 604 (7th Cir. 1985) (observing circuit court
uniformity on this issue).
" See sources cited supra note 10.
89 For discussion of this point, see Rebecca Hanner White, Vicarious and Personal
Liability for Employment Discrimination, 30 GA. L. REV. 509 (1996).
90 See Ronald Turner, Title VII and Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment:
Mislabeling the Standard of Employer Liability, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 817, 829-32
(1994); Justin S. Weddle, Note, Title VII Sexual Harassment: Recognizing an Employer's
Non-Delegable Duty to Prevent a Hostile Workplace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 724, 734 (1995).
9' 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
92 See id. at 2262. The Court suggested, however, that the tangible job action threatened
"would have taken the form of a denial of a raise or a promotion." Id. at 2268.
93 See id.
9' See id. at 2265.
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complained to anyone in authority about the manager's conduct, however, the district
court found Burlington "neither knew nor should have known" of the harassment
and, thus, could not be held liable for it. 9'
Ellerth, however, contended that her manager's unfulfilled threats of retaliation
constituted a quid pro quo claim. Arguing that employers are vicariously liable for
quid pro quo harassment, Ellerth contended that Burlington Industries thus should
be held responsible for its manager's conduct, despite its lack of knowledge of any
harassment. The Seventh Circuit, en banc, employing a variety of rationales, agreed
with Ellerth 96
The question presented to the Supreme Court on certiorari was whether the facts
alleged by Ellerth constituted a quid pro quo claim. As the Court recognized,
however, the issue was not really about attaching labels to sexual harassment,97 but
was instead about employer liability for that harassment.'' The question posed by the
facts of Ellerth was whether an employer can be vicariously liable for a supervisor's
unfulfilled threats to deny an employee tangible job benefits if she does not submit
to his sexual demands.
Beth Faragher couched her case against the City of Boca Raton in different
terms, overtly presenting the Court with the question of employer liability.99
Faragher's was plainly a case of hostile work environment harassment, because no
tangible job benefits, nor threats to deny those benefits, were at issue.'00 Faragher
asked the Court to decide when an employer would be liable for a hostile work
environment created by its supervisors.
95 Id. at 2263.
96 See id. at 2263-64.
9' These labels have been criticized. As one commentator noted:
The snappy Latin name given these cases in an influential book about sexual
harassment probably helped ensure that quid pro quo retaliation cases remained
classified, as defendants had sought, as a kind of sexual harassment, rather than
being trotted back to the adverse-job-action barn where they belonged. Thus was
born a "class" of cases that was redundant virtually from its inception.
Scalia, supra note 36, at 311. Eugene Scalia advocated eliminating quid pro quo as a separate
category of discrimination claims, as it "injects needless formalism and complexity to the
analysis of employment discrimination." Id. at 319. Essentially, that is what the Court did in
Ellerth.
98 See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2265 ("The question presented on certiorari is whether Ellerth
can state a claim of quidpro quo harassment, but the issue of real concern to the parties is
whether Burlington has vicarious liability for Slowik's alleged misconduct, rather than
liability limited to its own negligence.").
99 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
"0 Faragher alleged, and the trial court found, that her supervisors had groped her, made
frequent and vulgar references to and about women, and engaged in other offensive conduct
of a sexual nature. See id. at 2281.
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The Eleventh Circuit had found that, although the harassment was severe or
pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment, the employer could not
be held vicariously liable for the harassment.' The Eleventh Circuit, en banc,
reasoned that the supervisors' conduct was outside the scope of their authority °2 and
further found that the agency relationship had not aided the supervisors in
accomplishing the harassment."0 3 It thus rejected vicarious employer liability for the
supervisors' creation of a hostile working environment. Nor, found the Eleventh
Circuit, could the employer be liable directly for the harassment because it lacked
either actual or constructive knowledge that the harassment had occurred.'04
The Supreme Court resolved both the Ellerth and Faragher cases by adopting
the following standard for employer liability, one that rejected the categories "quid
pro quo" and "hostile work environment" as determinative. Under the Court's
holdings in Ellerth and Faragher, an employer always will be vicariously liable
when supervisory discrimination results in a tangible job action. Even when no
tangible job action has occurred, an employer will be vicariously liable for
supervisory discrimination that is sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the
terms and conditions of employment. When no tangible job action has occurred,
however, the employer may mount an affirmative defense to liability. If an employer
can prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, "(a) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and
(b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise," it may avoid liability.' This affirmative defense is unavailable when a
tangible job action has occurred."°
.0 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, I 11 F.3d 1530, 1536-37 (1 th Cir. 1997) (en
banc).
'02 See id. at 1536 (classifying the harassment as a "frolic").
0'3 See id at 1537. The Eleventh Circuit found the supervisors' position had not aided
them in accomplishing the harassment, as neither had threatened Faragher with the loss of
her job or promotional opportunities. See id. Absent such overt threats, the court declined to
find that the agency relationship had aided the harassment.
104 See id. at 1538-89. The Eleventh Circuit refused to equate pervasive harassment with
constructive employer knowledge. Faragher had not complained to officials at city hall, and
the court thus found no direct knowledge. Although Faragher had complained to another
supervisor, the Eleventh Circuit did not consider those complaints to be tantamount to
complaints to the city itself. The Supreme Court did not resolve when an employee's
complaints to a supervisor will be sufficient to establish employer knowledge of the
harassment, given its adoption of the vicarious liability standard. See Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2294 (1998).
'0' Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2269-70 (1998); Faragher, 118 S.
Ct. at 2292-93.
106 See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293.
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Neither Kimberly Ellerth nor Beth Faragher alleged she had suffered a tangible
job action. Because Ellerth never had made use of her employer's procedure for
reporting harassment, her claim was remanded to permit her employer an opportunity
to mount an affirmative defense to liability. 7 Faragher, however, was entitled to a
verdict in her favor because the Court found, as a matter of law, that the employer
could not prove the affirmative defense. °8 The City of Boca Raton had not
communicated any policy against harassment at Faragher's work station nor had it
made any effort to monitor its supervisors' conduct.0 9 Thus, it could not show it had
taken reasonable steps to prevent the harassment." 0
The Court's decision to apply vicarious liability principles to hostile work
environment claims bucked the trend in the lower courts and, accordingly, came as
something of a surprise. But application of vicarious liability to hostile work
environment claims was consistent with the Court's recognition in Oncale that such
claims are disparate treatment claims and should be govemed by disparate treatment
principles. Indeed, the Court's adoption of an affirmative defense to employer
liability in hostile work environment cases instead was the anomaly, reflecting an
effort by the Court to reconcile its holding in Ellerth and Faragher with its dicta in
Meritor.'"
Although both the Ellerth and Faragher decisions confronted employer liability
for supervisory sexual harassment, the holdings in fact have a much broader sweep.
The liability principles developed in these two cases should apply to all
discrimination claims. The reasoning the Court used to justify vicarious liability in
Ellerth and Faragher explains, in basic terms, why vicarious employer liability for
supervisory discrimination generally is appropriate for disparate treatment claims.
Additionally, the justification proffered for an affirmative defense to employer
liability when a hostile work environment is present is one that should apply
whenever a supervisor's discrimination does not result in a tangible job action,
whether or not sexual harassment is involved.
107 See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2271.
108 See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293.
109 See id.
"~o See id. at 2293-94.
"' "In particular, we are bound by our holding in Meritor that agency principles constrain
the imposition of vicarious liability principles in cases of supervisory harassment....
Congress has not altered Meritor's rule even though it has made significant amendments to
Title VII in the interim." Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270 (citations omitted). See also Faragher,
118 S. Ct. at 2291 ("We are not entitled to recognize this theory under Title VII unless we
can square it with Meritor's holding that an employer is not 'automatically' liable for
harassment by a supervisor who creates the requisite degree of discrimination .... ").
The decisions in Ellerth and Faragher leave the distinct impression that, had the
question been presented to the Court as a matter of first impression, the Court would not have
recognized the affirmative defense.
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A. Why Vicarious Liability?
Although vicarious employer liability for supervisory discrimination is a well
accepted principle in employment discrimination cases, the Court never had
explained why an employer should be held liable for discriminatory actions by
supervisors, particularly when the discrimination occurred without the employer's
knowledge and was at odds with employer directives prohibiting discrimination.112
Title VII's definition of "employer" includes any agent of the employer." 3 In
Meritor, the Court looked to the statutory definition and suggested that common law
agency principles serve as guidelines for determining when an employer would be
liable for discrimination by its employees." 4 The Court further observed that
"Congress' decision to define 'employer' to include any 'agent' of an
employer... surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees
for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible.""' 5 The Court,
however, offered no suggestion as to what those limits should be.
In a prior article, I offered an explanation, by reference to common law agency
principles, of why vicarious employer liability for supervisory discrimination,
including claims of quid pro quo sexual harassment, was appropriate." 6 That
analysis, briefly summarized, is as follows.
Vicarious employer liability for supervisory discrimination often will be based
on the principle of respondeat superior."7 That principle is outlined in section 219
of the Restatement (Second) ofAgency: "A master is subject to liability for the torts
of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment.""' An
action done for the purpose, in whole or in part, of serving the master is within the
112 As the Court in Ellerth noted:
"[T]he courts have consistently held employers liable for the discriminatory
discharges of employees by supervisory personnel, whether or not the employer
knew, or should have known, or approved of the supervisor's actions." Although
few courts have elaborated how agency principles support this rule, we think it
reflects a correct application of the aided in the agency relation standard.
Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2268 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-71
(1986)).
" "The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce.., and any agent of such a person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
114 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
"' Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)).
116 See White, supra note 89, at 526-38 and sources cited therein.
"' See EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1281 (7th Cir. 1995)
(holding that respondeat superior applied under the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA")); Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that
respondeat superior applies under Title VII).
I' I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1959).
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scope of employment and thus is an action for which the employer will be vicariously
liable.
When a supervisor discriminates in order to further his employer's interests, the
employer will be liable for that discrimination, even if the discrimination is
prohibited by the employer."9 Respondeai superior thus offers an explanation for
much vicarious employer liability. For example, a supervisor who refuses to hire a
woman with small children because he believes women with small children will miss
work more frequently than other workers has acted to further his employer's interests,
even if he has acted unlawfully and against company directives. 20
What happens, though, when a supervisor discriminates not to further his
employer's interests but solely to indulge his own biases? It is into this category of
cases that virtually all sexual harassment claims fall, because a supervisor who denies
a promotion to an employee who refuses his sexual advances or who sexually fondles
a subordinate will not be acting, nor believe he is acting, to further his employer's
interests.' Respondeat superior thus provides no support for vicarious liability for
sexual harassment.
22
Respondeat superior, however, is not an exclusive means of establishing
vicarious liability. Even when conduct is outside the scope of an agent's
"9 As explained by the Ninth Circuit, respondeat superior would be of little use if an
employer could avoid its application by telling its agents: "[D]on't discriminate." See Miller,
600 F.2d at 213.
20 See White, supra note 89, at 530-31.
121 See id. at 531-32. Sexual harassment, of course, is not the only category of cases to
which this reasoning applies. Supervisors may discriminate based on their own biases,
knowing their actions do not serve their masters' purposes, or may retaliate because they are
angry at a subordinate who reported wrongdoing, knowing the retaliation is against the
interests of their employer.
22 Some jurisdictions, however, have abandoned the traditional test in favor of a more
expansive approach to scope of employment. If the employment relationship caused the harm
(including by furnishing the wrongdoer access to the victim), then vicarious liability will
exist. This approach allocates the costs of the harm that arise from the employment
relationship to the employer. See Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 69, at 500; Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious
Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal
Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 588-93 (1988); Katherine S. Anderson, Note, Employer
Liability Under Title VIIfor Sexual Harassment After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 1258, 1275-77 (1987).
In Faragher, Justice Souter recognized this more expansive approach to the scope of
employment doctrine and that it could be justified as a reasonable allocation of the costs of
doing business between the employer and the victim. Nonetheless, the Court accepted the
traditional common law approach to the scope of employment and, thus, generally viewed
sexual harassment as outside the scope of employment. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
118 S. Ct. 2275, 2288-90 (1998); see also White, supra note 89, at 533 n. 124 (noting that
the Court accepted the "traditional approach to scope of employment").
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employment, vicarious liability will exist, according to the Restatement (Second) of
Agency section 219(2)(d), if the agent "was aided in accomplishing the tort by the
existence of the agency relation."'' 23 It is this agency law principle that supports
vicarious employer liability for any supervisory discrimination that results in a
tangible job action, whether or not motivated by a purpose to serve the master. As
I have explained:
Discrimination-at-large is not prohibited by federal law. For a violation
of Title VII, the ADEA, or the ADA to occur, there must be
discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. It
is the supervisor's status as supervisor that gives him power over the
terms, conditions, and privileges of another's employment. Without that
status, he could not violate the statute.'
24
Thus, whenever a supervisor's discrimination results in ajob benefit or detriment that
his status as supervisor enables him to grant or withhold, vicarious employer liability
necessarily will exist because the agency relationship will have aided the supervisor
in accomplishing the .wrong.'21
In Ellerth, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, used precisely
this reasoning to explain why vicarious employer liability is present when a
supervisor's discrimination results in a tangible employment action. The Court
fashioned federal law principles from "the general common law of agency" in
interpreting the statute's definition of employer.126 First, whenever a supervisor's
tangible job action is within the scope of his employment-i.e., done with a purpose
at least in part to serve the master-respondeat superior will apply.'27 Second, an
action that is unlawful or against company policy will not defeat respondeat superior
liability if the discrimination is done with a purpose of furthering the employer's
business. 128 Third, the Court recognized that respondeat superior will not apply to
most sexual harassment cases, as a purpose to serve the employer's interests usually
will be absent. 129 Fourth, the Court found that, even when respondeat superior is not
I23 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1959).
124 White, supra note 89, at 533-34.
125 See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (1 th Cir. 1982); Sykes, supra note
122, at 607; EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No.
645, 405:6681, at 6694-95 (Mar. 19, 1990).
126 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2265 (1998).
127 See id. at 2266.
28 See id at 2266. See also Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2288-89.
129 See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2266-67.
As Courts of Appeals have recognized, a supervisor acting out of gender-based
animus or a desire to fulfill sexual urges may not be actuated by a purpose to
serve the employer.... The harassing supervisor often acts for personal motives,
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applicable, vicarious employer liability will exist when the agency relationship aided
the supervisor in accomplishing the discrimination.130 Thus, it is the Restatement
(Second) ofAgency section 219(2)(d) "aided in... the agency relation" rule that
supports vicarious liability for sexual harassment. 3'
When will the agency relationship aid the supervisor in accomplishing the
wrongdoing? The Court in Ellerth began by rejecting the argument that the agency
relationship aids in accomplishing the tort because it furnishes proximity to and
contact with the victim. Otherwise, an employer would be strictly liable for all
workplace discrimination, including that by coworkers, a standard the Court
rejected.'32 As the Court noted, "[t]he aided in the agency relation standard
... requires the existence of something more than the employment relation itself":1
33
Something more necessarily will be present, the Court stated, "when a supervisor
takes a tangible employment action against the subordinate, '134 In such cases,
vicarious employer liability always will exist. This result holds because "[w]hen a
supervisor makes a tangible employment decision, there is assurance the injury could
not have been inflicted absent the agency relation.' 35 Only supervisors, not co-
workers, can take such actions that "fall within the special province of the
supervisor."'36 By delegating to the supervisor the power to take such actions, the
employer has enabled the agent to commit the wrong and, thus, is vicariously liable
motives unrelated and even antithetical to the objectives of the employer.... The
general rule is that sexual harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the
scope of employment.
Id. (citations omitted).
130 See id. at 2267-68. The Court rejected the "apparent authority" branch of vicarious
liability, because it is the misuse of actual, not apparent, authority that is at issue in cases of
supervisory harassment. See id.
'3' 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1959).
32 See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2268. Although the Court did not address employer liability
for coworker harassment in either Ellerth or Faragher, its opinions clearly suggest that
employers will be only directly, not vicariously, liable for such harassment. Presumably, an
employer will be directly liable for its own inaction if it knew or should have known of the
harassment and failed to take steps to prevent or remedy it.
133 Id.
134 Id.
'3 Id. at 2269. As the Court further explained:
A tangible employment action in most cases inflicts direct economic harm. As
a general proposition, only a supervisor, or other person acting with the authority
of the company, can cause this sort of injury. A co-worker can break a co-
worker's arm as easily as a supervisor, and anyone who has regular contact with
an employee can inflict psychological injuries by his or her offensive conduct.
But one co-worker (absent some elaborate scheme) cannot dock another's pay,
nor can one co-worker demote another.
Id. (citations omitted).
136 Id.
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for the discrimination. The supervisor's action "becomes for Title VII purposes the
act of the employer."' 3
Hostile work environment harassment, however, involves no tangible
employment action. For that reason, the Court recognized that determining whether
the agency relationship has aided the supervisor in committing the harassment is
more difficult. Both supervisors and coworkers can utter epithets, grope or fondle,
tell dirty jokes, leer, or be abusive to those with whom they work. That harassment,
by either coworkers or supervisors, can be severe or pervasive enough to
constructively alter working conditions. In reasoning fleshed out more fully by
Justice Souter's opinion in Faragher,"' however, the Court found vicarious liability
appropriate when a supervisor creates a hostile work environment.139 While both
coworkers and supervisors can harass, harassing conduct by a supervisor is more
threatening because of the supervisor's position. 4 In down-to-earth terms, the Court
described the distinction:
When a fellow employee harasses, the victim can walk away or tell the
offender where to go, but it may be difficult to offer such responses to a
supervisor, whose "power to supervise-[which may be] to hire and fire,
and to set work schedules and pay rates-does not disappear.., when he
chooses to harass through insults and offensive gestures rather than
directly with threats of firing or promises of promotion."''
Moreover, the Court noted that "employers have greater opportunity and
incentive to screen [supervisors], train them, and monitor their performance."' 142
Thus, vicarious employer liability for supervisory harassment severe or pervasive
enough to alter the terms or conditions of employment and create a hostile
environment is appropriate. 43
137 id.
131 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
"' See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
140 See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2291.
"' Id. (quoting Estrich, supra note 20, at 854).
142 Id.
'4' None of the Court's opinions last Term addressed the question of when harassment will
rise to the requisite level of severity or pervasiveness, because none of the cases presented
that question to the Court. When no tangible employment action exists, however, any
discriminatory conduct, whether or not labeled "harassment," should be considered to
determine whether it meets the severe or pervasive test. See Schultz, supra note 32, at 171 1-
29, who criticizes courts for "disaggregating" sexual conduct from nonsexual conduct and
evaluating the conduct separately.
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B. Why an Affirmative Defense?
Despite recognizing the appropriateness of vicarious employer liability for a
hostile work environment created by a supervisor, in Ellerth and Faragher the Court
nonetheless created an affirmative defense for employers. This defense arose from
the Court's efforts to conform its holdings in Ellerth and Faragher "with Meritor's
holding that an employer is not 'automatically' liable for harassment by a supervisor
who creates the requisite degree of discrimination.""' Thus, stare decisis, in large
part, explains the defense's creation. The defense, moreover, furthers the deterrence
goals of Title VII by encouraging employers to adopt and to enforce stern
antidiscrimination policies and by encouraging employees to minimize harm by
reporting harassing activity to their employers.'45 Prompt reporting of such conduct
often will prevent it from becoming severe or pervasive enough to support a claim.'46
The affirmative defense also is supported by the agency law analysis giving rise
to vicarious liability. When a supervisor takes a tangible employment action against
a subordinate, the Court knows the agency relationship has aided the discrimination.
Without the authority to take the tangible employment action, no discrimination
could have occurred.'47 In hostile work environment cases, however, the Court
assumes the relationship has aided the supervisor in accomplishing the harassment.
The Court assumes subordinates will be reluctant, in the words of the Court, to tell
a supervisor "where to go."'4 Because this merely is an assumption, however, it is
appropriate to give the employer the opportunity to dispel it. When an employer has
an effective, well-publicized policy in place for reporting harassing behavior, then
employees should be far less reluctant to tell their supervisors "where to go," or at
least to tell their employers what their supervisors have been doing. The justification
for vicarious liability in such cases becomes far more suspect, because courts have
144 Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2291. In following Meritor, Justice Souter relied not only on
stare decisis, which enjoys a heightened presumption in statutory cases, but also on the fact
that Congress had amended Title VII in response to several of the Court's decisions. "The
decision of Congress to leave Meritor intact is conspicuous." Id. at 2291 n.4.
14' The deterrence policies of the statute that the Court believed would be furthered
through encouragement of the promulgation and enforcement of antidiscrimination policies
were invoked. See id. at 2292. That a victim has a duty to avoid or to minimize harm and/or
damages was "imported from the general theory of damages." Id
146 It is the unusual occasion when a single incident will support a hostile work
environment claim. See Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, supra note 125, at 6690.
An employee who experiences harassing conduct and who takes steps to report it can prevent
the conduct from becoming severe or pervasive enough to constructively alter her working
conditions. Thus, if an employer has provided a means to avoid a claim from arising, an
employee may not choose to sidestep those means and, instead, allow conduct to continue
to the point at which a winning claim may exist.
141 See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
141 Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2291.
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less reason to believe that the agency relationship aided the supervisor in
accomplishing the harassment.
C. Remedial Implications
The Court's recognition of vicarious employer liability for supervisory
harassment has important remedial implications, although those implications went
undiscussed in Faragher and Ellerth. Had the Court accepted the lower courts'
negligence standard for imposing liability in hostile work environment cases, the
basis for imposing compensatory and punitive damages in such cases would vanish.
As mentioned above, only intentional discrimination can support a claim for
compensatory or punitive damages under Title VIIV49 The Court's recognition that
sexual harassment "presupposes intentional conduct"'5 and its willingness to impute
that intent to the employer through vicarious liability enables recovery of these
damages in the context in which they are perhaps most important: when no other
remedy exists.
The "knew or should have known" standard adopted by the lower courts is one
based in negligence. 5' Thus, had the Court in Faragher and Ellerth found only
direct, not vicarious, liability appropriate in hostile work environment cases, that
finding would have circumvented Congress' intent to provide a remedy for the
victims of hostile work environments. Recognition that vicarious liability is proper
neatly avoids this dilemma.
D. The Bigger Picture
What does resolving the liability conundrum for sexual harassment have to do
with other disparate treatment claims? Quite a bit. The question now is whether the
supervisor's discriminatory conduct, whether based on the employee's sex, race,
religion, national origin, or complaints of discrimination, has resulted in a tangible
employment action. If so, then vicarious employer liability will exist, and no
affirmative defense will be available.
Accordingly, the next major issue in disparate treatment cases will be
distinguishing a tangible employment action from that which is not tangible.'52
'4 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
150 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2266 (1998).
's' See id. at 2267.
152 In Ellerth, the Court defined a tangible employment action as follows: "A tangible
employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring,
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities or a
decision causing a significant change in benefits." Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2268. This language,
viewed in isolation, suggests that an employment action must pose a significant disadvantage
before it may be viewed as tangible.
[Vol. 7:3
THERE'S NOTHING SPECIAL ABOUT SEX
Elsewhere I have suggested that "tangible employment action" must be understood
broadly to encompass any action that supervisors alone can undertake, whether or not
the action is "materially adverse."' 53 The Court's reasoning in Ellerth for imposing
vicarious liability for tangible employment actions is based on the fact that such
discrimination necessarily will be aided by the agency relationship because it is the
supervisor's status as supervisor that enables him to take the challenged action.'54
The agency principles justifying liability thus should inform the meaning of a
"tangible employment action."
When no such tangible employment action exists, however that term ultimately
is defined, the question becomes whether a supervisor's discriminatory conduct is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to constructively alter the conditions of
employment.' If so, then the employer will be vicariously liable, although it may
mount an affirmative defense.
Application of these vicarious liability principles thus allows the employer to
escape liability for a supervisor's impermissibly motivated conduct in two instances:
first, when the conduct, although improperly motivated, is neither a tangible
employment action nor severe or pervasive and, second, when the discriminatory
conduct is severe or pervasive but the employer can establish its affirmative defense.
One would expect prudent employers, following Ellerth and Faragher, to adopt
antidiscrimination/retaliation policies, including but not limited to prohibitions on
sexual harassment, and to disseminate and enforce those policies vigorously.5 6
' White, supra note 37, at 1156-58. There are two problems with requiring a materially
adverse action before a tangible employment action will be found. First, that approach is not
fully in conformity with the agency principles that led the Court to impose vicarious liability.
The touchstone for vicarious liability is supervisory authority-actions a supervisor, but not
a coworker, has been empowered by the employer to undertake. While many, if not most of
these, will bear economic consequences, not all will. The appropriate dividing line is not
whether the action involves a significant change, but whether it is an action in which only
supervisors, because they are supervisors, can engage.
Second, if supervisory discrimination is not viewed as a tangible employment action,
then it falls wholly outside the statute, unless it is sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter
working conditions and create a hostile or abusive work environment.
's' See supra notes 126-43 and accompanying text.
m This standard would apply to any discriminatory or retaliatory conduct by a supervisor
not involving a tangible employment action, not simply to sexual harassment. If an employer
is not vicariously liable for the discrimination, then no discrimination by a statutory employer
has occurred. The conduct thus falls outside the statute if it is not severe or pervasive, even
though it was improperly motivated.
'56 Another issue that will assume increasing importance in the wake of Ellerth and
Faragher is the question of whether an employee's use of internal antidiscrimination
procedures is to be viewed as participation conduct within the meaning of section 704, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994), which prohibits retaliation. Section 704 contains two
clauses-the participation clause, which protects an employee who "has made a charge,
testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
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In summary, when allegations of supervisory discrimination or retaliation are
made, the following analysis should be undertaken. First, has supervisory conduct
been motivated by an unlawful purpose? Second, does this impermissibly motivated
supervisory conduct involve a tangible employment action? If so, then the employer
is liable automatically for the supervisor's discrimination. Third, if no tangible
employment action exists, is the supervisor's improperly motivated conduct severe
or pervasive enough to constructively alter the terms or conditions of employment?
If so, then the employer should be vicariously liable because courts are willing to
presume the supervisor's status as supervisor has enabled the conduct to reach the
level necessary to constructively alter the terms or conditions of employment.
Fourth, the employer may rebut that presumption by proving that it took reasonable
care to prevent and to correct promptly the discriminatory conduct and the employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of those measures or otherwise failed to avoid
the harm.
Suppose, for example, an employee alleges her employer has retaliated against
her because she complained of discrimination. She alleges her supervisor gave her
more onerous work assignments, referred to her as a "backstabbing bitch" and glared
at her. Does she have a retaliation claim? Yes, if she can establish the actions she
complains of were motivated by her discrimination complaints and that a tangible
employment action has occurred. The more onerous work assignment should be
viewed as such, as it is the supervisor's status as a supervisor that enables him to give
the work assignment and, thus, employer liability will be established. Were the more
onerous work assignment not viewed as a tangible employment action, however, then
the supervisor's conduct, taken as a whole, should be evaluated to determine whether
it is sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter work conditions. If so, then the
employer will be vicariously liable for the supervisor's conduct. The employer,
however, may avoid liability if it can show that it took reasonable steps to prevent the
under this subchapter," and the opposition clause, which protects an employee who "has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a) (1994). Courts have viewed conduct under the participation clause as absolutely
protected, while many view opposition conduct protected only if it is reasonable and in good
faith. See Little v. United Tech., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (1 th Cir. 1997).
The Eleventh Circuit recently held that an employee's use of her employer's internal
complaint procedures is not participation conduct and, thus, not protected against retaliation
unless her allegations of sexual harassment are objectively reasonable. See Clover v. Total
Sys. Servs., Inc., 157 F.3d 824 (1 1th Cir. 1998). Such procedures should be expected to
proliferate given the Court's recognition in Ellerth and Faragher of an affirmative defense
for supervisory harassment that does not involve a tangible employment action, a defense that
often will turn upon the existence of an internal complaint procedure. Moreover, an
employee's failure to use those procedures can deprive her of a claim that may otherwise
exist. Allowing an employer to discipline an employee who makes use of the procedure, if
her allegations of discrimination are deemed not to be objectively reasonable, seems at odds
with Ellerth's and Faragher's encouragement of the use of such procedures.
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conduct and the employee failed to make use of those steps or otherwise to avoid the
harm.
CONCLUSION
Taken together, the Court's recent sexual harassment decisions clarify the
analysis to be used for sexual harassment cases and for disparate treatment cases
generally. Rather than viewing sexual harassment as somehow different from other
disparate treatment claims because it involves sexual conduct, sexual harassment
should be understood as intentional discrimination because of sex. Although the
evidentiary routes for proving unlawful motive may vary in these cases from others
alleging unlawful motive, the legal analysis should be the same. As in other disparate
treatment settings, the critical question is whether the employer did what it did
because of the employee's sex, race, or other protected characteristic.
Whether or not a sexual harassment claim is present, when a supervisor's
discrimination or retaliation results in a tangible employment action, the employer is
vicariously liable, even when that discrimination occurs without the employer's
knowledge and against its directives. Absent a tangible employment action, a
supervisor's discriminatory or retaliatory conduct must be evaluated to determine
whether it is severe or pervasive enough to alter an employee's working conditions.
If it is, his employer is vicariously liable, although the employer may offer an
affirmative defense to liability.
Understanding that disparate treatment principles apply to sexual harassment
claims, and that employer liability principles developed in sexual harassment cases
apply to disparate treatment claims outside the sexual harassment context, helps
simplify and unify an area of the law growing needlessly complex. For that, the
Court's decisions of this Term are to be commended.
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